

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 968133
By JR NARA Date 6/24/04

57

FILE

FCL-1/A16-3

COMMANDER BATTLESHIP DIVISION TWO

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

Serial 0011

S-E-C-R-E-T

4 January 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO AULICK ltr. BD569/
A16/19 Serial 00170
of 8 December 1944.

From: Commander Battleship Squadron ONE
(Commander Task Group 77.2).

To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Via : (1) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(Commander Task Force 77).
(2) Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of Action on 29 November 1944,
Forwarding of.

1. Forwarded.

2. There seems to be a growing belief that the principal weapon of defense, once planes have eluded the CAP, is the 5" gun, and that the 40 MM and the 20 MM are relatively ineffective against a suicide attack. The reason for this is that unless the plane can be sufficiently damaged to deflect it, it has a high chance of success. It is true that both the 40 MM and 20 MM are capable of deflecting planes but this deflection usually occurs too late to insure completely that no damage occurs to the target.

3. The conduct of the personnel of the AULICK was excellent.


J. B. CILDENDORF.
Copy to:
CO AULICK.

735

③

2 439

28

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NND968133*
By *RA* NARA Date *6/24/07*

**UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET**

Reg. No. *OM-01474*
R.S. No. *2 439*

A16-3(1)(T-3-4/eeh)

Serial: *00383*

2 FEB 1945

SECRET

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
CO, AULICK ltr secret
DD569/A16/A9 serial 00170
dated 8 December 1944.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Report of Action on 29 November 1944,
Forwarding of.

1. Forwarded.
2. The performance of the personnel of the AULICK was commendable.
3. Routing is changed in accordance with Seventh Fleet Confidential Letter 1CL-44.

C. E. HOOK,
Deputy.

Copy to:
ComBatRom ONE
CO, USS AULICK(DD569)

1945 FEB 8 11 31
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
FLAG OFFICE
RECEIVED

2 439


97593

735

2

FILMED

29



DD569/A16/A9
Serial: 00170

U.S.S. AULICK (DD569)

8 December 1944.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer.
To : Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Task Group 77.2.
(2) Commander Task Force 77.
(3) Commander Seventh Fleet.
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of Action on 29 November 1944, forwarding
of.

Reference: (a) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 2CL-44,
(b) PacFlt Conf. ltr. 16CL-44.

Enclosures: (A) Narrative of Action.
(B) Chronological log.
(C) Performance of Ordnance Material.
(D) Battle Damage.
(E) Special Comments.
(F) Personnel performance and casualties.

1. In accordance with references, enclosures are forwarded herewith for subject action.

J. D. Andrew
J. D. ANDREW.

Advance copy to:
Cominch (1)
Cinepac (2)

DECLASSIFIED BY 91C DATE 6-16-64

97593

FILMED

2 439

SECRET

NARRATIVE OF ACTION
29 November, 1944

1. This vessel was assigned as a anti-submarine patrol vessel on patrol across the entrance to Leyte Gulf between Homohon Island and Dinagat. The northern half of this patrol was patrolled by the U.S.S. SAUFLEY, the southern half by this vessel. The length of the individual patrol lines was four and a half miles, a patrol speed of 18 knots was used. As this vessel approached the southern end of the patrol radar contact was made on a group of planes and six planes were sighted at about 1750 Item time. These planes were taken under fire by the condition watch and the ship went to general quarters immediately. One of the planes peeled off from the formation and made a dive attack from the relative bearing of 185, dropped his bomb outboard of the ship near frame #110 port, struck the SC radar antennae and exploded on hitting the water approximately 20 yards off the port bow without further damaging the vessel. At this time it was noted that the U.S.S. SAUFLEY was also under attack. Another plane started in on a run from approximately 200° relative then turned and made an "S" turn on the starboard side and came in from a relative bearing of 180, struck the starboard guy on the mast and the starboard side of the bridge windshield. Both plane and bomb apparently exploded just above the main deck outboard the wardroom. Both of these planes were fired upon by 5", 40mm and 20mm. The first plane to attack was not on fire before hitting the water but burst into flames at time. The second plane was noted to be burning from several hits as it passed over the stern. The explosion of the second plane set fire to powder in number two gun and handling room and killed the men therein as well as several of the men on guns 41 and 42. The fragments from either exploding bomb or plane killed and wounded men on the flying bridge and the bridge area. Total casualties, 3 officers and 28 men killed, 1 man missing and wounded 64. Among the wounded were the doctor and one pharmacist's mate on duty in the wardroom.

2. At this time the SAUFLEY which had been hit requested that the AULICK stand by to render them assistance as they were unable to immediately determine the amount of damage sustained. The AULICK proceeded to the vicinity of the SAUFLEY and stayed close aboard astern until the arrival on the scene of the SIGOURNEY. The later vessel transferred their doctor to this vessel to assist in caring for the wounded. Later the PRINGLE relieved us on patrol and transferred their doctor to the AULICK after which the SIGOURNEY'S doctor was returned and this vessel proceeded into San Pedro Bay.

3. This vessel was detailed to the anti-submarine screen of Task Group 77.2 operating in Leyte Gulf, Philippine Island. On the morning of the 29th of November the AULICK was ordered to relieve the SIGOURNEY on anti-submarine patrol "Charlie". This relief was made at 1100 and the patrol was carried on without incident until 1750 Item.

4. The mission of this vessel at the time of the air attack was to detect and destroy any enemy submarines attempting to enter Leyte Gulf across the patrol lane designated as patrol "Charlie" the instructions received from the SIGOURNEY are as follows:

PATROL LINE 030 DASH 210 DEGREES TRUE THROUGH POINT ONE
MILE 120 FROM POINT REB X SIGOURNEY PATROLLING SECTOR FOUR
POINT FIVE MILES LONG BEGINNING ONE MILE 210 DEGREES TRUE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <i>NND968133</i>
By <i>RA</i> Date <i>6/30/07</i>

PART I (Cont'd.)
SECRET

NARRATIVE OF ACTION
29 November, 1944

FROM ABOVE POINT X SAUFLEY PATROLLING CORRESPONDING SECTOR
TO NORTHWARD PASS MID POINT OF PATROL ON NORTHERLY HEADING ON
HOUR AND HALF HOUR USE PATROL SPEED OF EIGHTEEN KNOTS MAKE ALL
TURNS TO SEAWARD BT

5. Task Group 77.2 was known to be operating in the central Gulf area, the exact position unknown. The SAUFLEY had patrol "Baker" immediately to the northward, other friendly surface craft were observed to be in the vicinity during the day apparently on patrol duty. Friendly planes were frequently seen on the radar screen and sighted visually. These were usually patrol bombers and Navy fighters on strikes.

6. The only enemy forces sighted by this vessel were the six planes which attacked the two patrol destroyers and these were identified as Japanese planes type OSCAR.

7. Wind force four from 60° true, clouds cumulonimbus seven to eight tenths coverage, ceiling between one and three thousand feet, depending on local showers. Horizontal visibility good.

ENCLOSURE (A)

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 968133
 By RA Date 6/30/04

PART II
 SECRET


CHRONOLOGICAL LOG
 29 November, 1944

All times are zone minus nine, the zone time in use in the area.

1. The anti-submarine patrol line covered by this vessel is shown on the attacked navigational track. It will be noted that the southern end approaches very close to Desolation Point, Dinagat Island. The first contact with the enemy was by radar, true bearing 220°, distance 17 miles. This contact was lost due no doubt to the interference of the nearby land since when the planes were sighted thereafter they appeared to come directly from the mountainous island. As soon as sighted and identified the planes were taken under fire by the condition watch and general quarters was simultaneously sounded. It was necessary to shift fire from the formation of planes on the starboard bow to fire on one plane detected coming in from astern. This plane was hit by both 40mm and 20mm shells. The amount of damage to the plane was not determined; however, sufficient hits were made to have killed the pilot. In spite of this the Commanding Officer is of the assumption that the attack was a suicide dive. Whether or not the backing of the engines as the plane came in made the pilot over shoot can only be surmised but the radical change from 18 knots ahead to back full may have assisted in evading this first plane. The first plane crashed at about 1752 and fire was shifted to the second plane, at about 1754 all engines were signalled ahead flank and as the plane proceeded up the starboard side at the estimated range of 4000 yards fire was brought to bear on the starboard side until the plane reversed and came in from the stern. At this time gun two trained to the port and gun one remained trained on the starboard side as the plane came in from dead astern. The after guns continued fire and 20mm and 40mm hits were seen as well as several 5" close misses. The engines were again backed full as the plane came in and the planes wing was caught in the guy wire of the forward mast which arrested its progress and caused it to explode just above the main deck outboard the wardroom. Gun fire ceased and the repair parties put out the fire started in number two gun by the explosion of gasoline and shells. This fire was of the nature of a flash fire from the evidence in the compartments. Several cans of powder burned and only the prompt action of the repair parties prevented serious explosions. Within a minute or two of the time the plane crashed, approximately 1756, the Commanding Officer had sufficient reports from the damage control parties to allow him to go ahead standard speed and proceed to the vicinity of and to standby the SAUFLEY who requested we do so because they did not know the extent of their under water damage. Throughout the action the Commanding Officer relied on high speed and radical changes in speed and course for evasive maneuvers. The short range and high speed of the plane allowed the planes to choose attack bearings, however since the machine gun battery of this vessel is more or less concentrated on the stern, as all 20mm are there, it would appear that the pilots made a poor choice.

Appended are the navigational tracks and the sketches of the maneuvers of the plane

ENCLOSURE (B).



PART III
SECRET

1. PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT:

The first attacking plane was initially fired on by the condition watch and firing continued as the ship went to general quarters. CIC had given target bearing designation of bogeys to control. Planes were picked up at 17,000 yards, but FD radar did not obtain a good indication for tracking until planes cleared the land at about 12,000 yards. Computer was in automatic and a solution was obtained in partial radar. Optical spotting was difficult due to interference of stack gases, mast and rigging. The first plane had begun his run from astern after fire had been commenced on a higher group of three "Oscars"; control shifted to attacking plane who was close astern. Four rounds of Mark 18 fuzed projectiles were fired from gun #4 condition watch, one at the formation and three at the attacking plane. Gun #1 fired 2 rounds at the formation before control shifted to after plane.

The second plane was sighted 2 minutes after the first plane crashed. It was sighted crossing the stern at bearing 220° relative, range 8,000 yards. Using same method of control, solution was obtained at relative bearing 200°. The tracking on this run was difficult as the plane maneuvered quickly and seemed to be travelling at a very high speed. It is not believed that the plane was damaged by five inch bursts. Probable 40mm hits were observed, and many 20mm hits were scored at close range. The plane was burning as it crashed across the ship.

There were two material deficiencies and one personnel deficiency. The power on gun #5 projectile hoist kicked out after the first round but hoist was restarted after two rounds were sent up in manual. Number 3 20mm had a loading jam on the sixteenth round. Number 3 40mm had a loading jams (personnel) in both barrels.

2. AMMUNITION EXPENDED:

56 rounds Mark 18 fuzed 5"/38
310 rounds 40mm
445 rounds 20mm

3. COMMENTS ON ENEMY ORDNANCE MATERIAL:


The size of the bombs carried by the fighters is estimated as 250/500 pound anti-personel bombs. Either two bombs or one bomb and a gas tank was observed under the wings of the second planes. Neither plane attempted to strafe. The bomb load of the second plane exploded about 20 feet above the water as it crashed.

4. GENERAL COMMENTS:

The position of the aircraft against a nearby land background prevented the use of Mark 32 projectiles.

The following ammunition was exploded and burned from shrapnel hits:

ENCLOSURE (C)




PART III (Cont'd.)
SECRET

4. GENERAL COMMENTS: (Cont'd.)

- (a) One 5"/38 smokeless cartridge in the tray of gun #2.
- (b) One 5"/38 exposed smokeless cartridge and one cartridge in the tank, both in upper handling room of gun #2. Several cases were ruptured.
- (c) Several clips of 40mm ammunition in the ready service shield of 40mm #1.
- (d) Number 2 handling room projectile and powder stowage (A-408M and A-409M) had to be partially folded when flame from the upper handling room possibly gasoline went down the ammunition hoist.

ENCLOSURE (C)



PART IV
SECRET

ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Total destruction of two Nipponese planes - two OSCARS. Destruction beyond question.
2. All personnel in enemy planes killed in crashes.

DAMAGE CONTROL


1. The initial problem was that of extinguishing the fire in number 2 five inch gun mount and handling room. This was put out using spray nozzles on three hoses. CO2 extinguishers were used in the handling room in addition to water. Water was the primary means used. Fires in officers' country, #1 upper handling room and C.P.O. quarters and in the crew's quarters below. These spaces were confined to fires in bedding and were extinguished by water. The fire proof covers were not entirely successful as fragments penetrated them.

2. Wounded were treated with First Aid and where possible were moved aft to sick bay and the after crew's quarters. The loss of the services of the doctor and one pharmacist mate was serious but was partly compensated for by the skill of the ship's company in first aid. Care of the wounded was generally supervised by the Executive Officer, assisted by CIC and communication officers while the repair parties fought fires.

3. Immediate damage control was limited to fire fighting and the removal of the water so used. It was found necessary to sluice this water to lower levels to reduce free surface effect.

4. Subsequent measures included patching holes in decks and bulkheads to insure weather tightness.

ENCLOSURE (D)



PART V (Cont'd.)
SECRET

SPECIAL COMMENTS (Cont'd)

(f) Cont'd).


pharmacist's mate) organized and began treatment of the injured. About one half hour after the action a Medical Officer and pharmacist's mate were transferred aboard to another ship. There were 97 casualties - of these 28 died within the first few minutes; 3 received treatment but died within a few hours; 65 were transferred to an emergency hospital ship in favorable condition. One man is missing. The quantity of supplies, the organization of first aid teams and stretcher bearers and the quality of first aid rendered was surprisingly satisfactory in view of the severe alterations in prearranged plans.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Against the suicide type attack the machine guns are practically useless since the plane continues on its way even though badly damaged. Probably the only real defense is an active C.A.F.

2. Where ships are required to operate close to land the C.A.F. becomes doubly important as radar becomes inefficient and special ammunition can not be used. Air cover must be provided to give protection to ships performing the duties of shore bombardment, patrol and such cover must be on a twenty four hour a day schedule whenever practicable.

ENCLOSURE (E).



PART V
SECRET

SPECIAL COMMENTS

(a) Communications.

Prior to attack all communication equipment was functioning satisfactorily. After the first attack all antennae were checked for physical damage and were intact. After second attack it was seen that antennae were down and power was killed on all CW transmitters as a safety precaution. Test showed that MN and MAN were still operative but TBS transmitter and bridge reception were out. It was later learned that audio output cable from bridge remote control unit was cut by shrapnel. Overload relay on transmitter had tripped. External communications were maintained by use of the MN in communications with another destroyer which relayed our messages on other circuits until emergency antennae were run and a few hours later communications were back in an operative status, with 3 receiving and one transmitting antennae.

(b) Radar.

The planes were picked up on the SC-2 radar screen at 17 miles showing no IFF. At 11 miles they went into a fade and came out at 5 miles. They were picked up on the FD radar at 12,000 yards. Control utilized FD radar ranges while tracking and firing.

(c) Air Operations, own and enemy.

No friendly C.A.T. was detected in our vicinity. Two of the six enemy planes first apparently attacked the MARYLAND and PORTLAND which were attacked about 15 minutes after we were hit.

(d) Tactics.

(1) Own.

Ship maneuvered to bring the battery to bear. When the attacks were made and it was seen that the plane was aiming for the bridge, astern was rung up on both engines and the engines had answered before the plane hit. It is believed this maneuver made the plane overshoot its mark and lessened some-what the force of the blow.

(2) Enemy.

Both attacks were made from astern with the plane maneuvering radically in sharp banks and with great speed.

(e) The engineering department can be commended for answering all bells smartly during radical maneuvering during the attack. The emergency repair work of the electrical gang after the action was outstanding.

(f) Medical Department - The forward battle dressing station was immediately put out of operation. The Medical Officer and one pharmacist's mate were injured at this time. The remaining (chief pharmacist's mate and one second class

ENCLOSURE (E).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND968133*By *RA* NARA Date *6/24/07*PART VI
SECRETPERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

(a) The performance of the members of the crew and the doctors and pharmacist'mates borrowed from other vessels was uniformly excellent. Many individual acts of heroism, good judgement, fearless action, were the order of the day. The Commanding Officer is unable to list all such actions deserving mention and will rely on the statement, "The traditions of the Navy were upheld". Recommendations for awards will be the subject of separate correspondence.

(b) The casualties are covered by the appended medical report.

ENCLOSURE (F)

-9 OCT 1952

DD569/A16
Serial 00168

U.S.S. AULICK (DD569)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
7 December, 1944.

S E C R E T

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Subject: Damage Report.


Reference: (a) Cincpac flt ltr. 33CL-43.

Enclosure: (A) Engineering damage - P. 2
(B) Hull and Ordnance damage - P. 4
(C) Radar and Radio damage - P. 6


1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (A), (B) and (C) are forwarded herewith listing detailed damage received by this vessel on 29 November, 1944.

J. D. ANDREW.

Copy to: Cincpac(2)
Comdespac (2)
Comtaskforce 77 ✕
Comservpac
Comseron 10 (Rep)
Com7thflt.



U.S.S. AULICK (DD569)

ENGINEERING BATTLE DAMAGE

I. ELECTRICAL

A. Equipment.

1. Power panel #3-54-2 flooded.
2. Ice machine motors and control panels flooded.
3. Ventilation fan #1-68-1 demolished.
4. #1 control station anchor windlass - shrapnel.
5. Four 12" signal searchlights - damaged by shrapnel.
6. Starboard vertical fighting light - demolished.
7. One Submersible pump - shrapnel.
8. 6 MC speaker - shrapnel.
9. 1 MC transmitter control station #1 - shrapnel.
10. 1 MC reproducer class L - shrapnel.
11. Starboard Peloris - frame sprung.
12. Ice cream machine motor - flooded.
13. Ice cream storage box motor - flooded.
14. Starboard running light fixture - missing.
15. Starboard yardarm blinker light fixture - missing.
16. Mast head light fixture - missing.
17. Starboard 500 watt flood light - shrapnel.
18. 4 Windshield wipers - shrapnel.
19. Frigidaire, Wardroom - shrapnel.
20. 25 Room fans - burned, shrapnel, etc.
21. Warming oven, Wardroom - shrapnel.
22. 1 Silex unit - shrapnel.

B. Power Feeders.

1. Severed between power panel #3-54-2 and equipment served.
 - 1-FB-429
 - 2-FB-429
 - 3-FB-429
 - 4-FB-429
 - 5-FB-429
 - 6-FB-429
 - 7-FB-429
 - 8-FB-429
 - 9-FB-429
 - 10-FB-429
 - 11-FB-429
 - 12-FB-429
 - 13-FB-429
 - 14-FB-429
 - 15-FB-429
2. Severed between main distribution boards and equipment served.
 - FB-410
 - FB-411
 - FB-437
 - XFB-435
3. Severed between following points:
 - 2-FB-429-B From panel 01-66-1 to vent fan 01-61.

C. Battle lighting.

1. Severed many places from panel 2-56-1 on
 - 1-FB-107
 - 2-FB-107
 - 3-FB-107
 - 4-FB-107
2. Severed many places from relay 02-69-1
 - 2-FB-109
 - 3-FB-109
3. Severed many places from forward main dist. board.
 - FB-105

U.S.S. AULICK (DD569)

ENGINEERING BATTLE DAMAGE (Cont)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NND 968133

By

NARA Date 6/30/07

D. General lighting.

1. Severed many places from panel 2-56-1 on:
 - 1-F-107
 - 2-F-107
 - 3-F-107
 - 4-F-107
 - 6-F-107

E. Miscellaneous circuits severed in many places.

1. Running light circuits 33 to 55.
2. JA battle telephone circuit.
3. C-17MC-1
4. C-1MC-11
5. C-1MC-9
6. C-1MC-10
7. C-E-14
8. Degaussing "F" Coil.

II Mechanical.

A. Equipment.

1. Three rooms of ice box punctured with shrapnel.
2. Ice machine compressors submerged in water; various gas lines punctured.
3. Evaporator coils in butter and egg room punctured.
4. Ice cream mixer flooded.
5. Ice cream freezer box flooded.
6. Emergency diesel possible misalignment.

HULL DAMAGE

1. Following in starboard side of centerline from frame 72 to frame 20 and from flying bridge to second platform deck:

All plating, (aside from shell of ship), i.e., decks, overheads, insulation, bulkheads, doors, shields, vent lines, piping, voice tubes, lookout chairs, heads, lockers, plumbing, fixtures, furniture, bunks, filing cabinets, desks, ports, binnacle hood, searchlights, bridge radios, semaphore stands, guys, rigging, mast rigging, and numerous stanchions and frames are bent, damaged by shrapnel, flying metal, concussion, water and fire rendering them unfit in most cases for operation.

ORDNANCE DAMAGE5"/38 Mount #2

Mount Mark 30, Mod. 19 hit by close bomb shrapnel; powder cartridge in tray exploded and set mount on fire. Powder burned in upper handling room.

1. Shield, Mark 38, Mod. 1 a total wreck.
2. Roller path and base ring damaged.
3. Hydraulic unit shattered.
4. Slide Mark 34, Mod. 4 and housing Mark 1 Mod. 4 scarred.
5. Gun bore damaged.
6. Upper projectile hoist, Mark 2 Mod 1 and rammer holed by shrapnel.
7. Gun room wiring demolished.
8. Power panels in upper handling room damaged.
9. Ammunition (Dredger) hoist binds.

In general entire mount will have to be replaced, though parts are salvageable.

5"/38 Mount #1

Mount Mark 30, Mod. 18 hit by heavy bomb shrapnel.


1. Hydraulic unit damaged.
2. Gun bore damaged at muzzle.
3. Roller path and base ring scarred.
4. Indicator regulators, Mark 39, Mod. 1 and Mark 35, holed by shrapnel.
5. Believe gun trunion damaged.
6. Power panels damaged in upper handling room.
7. Shield, Mk. 38 holed by shrapnel.
8. Mount binds in train.

This mount should be lifted and new mount installed.

#1 40mm (Mark 1, Mod. 6)

1. Hydraulic system and wiring torn and slashed.
2. Elevation gearing scarred.
3. Barrels punctured by shrapnel.
4. Control panels below decks demolished.
5. Shield wrecked.
6. Empty case catcher shattered.



#1 40mm (Mark 1, Mod. 6) (Contd)

This mount will have to be removed and entire new mount installed

#2 40mm (Mount Mark 1, Mod. 6)

1. Mount wiring damaged.
2. Shield punctured.
3. One bad hole by base ring.

Mount is repairable but should be removed and overhauled. Now operating in local.

Mark 37, Mod. 22 director

1. Left end of Mark 42, Mod. 13 rangefinder sheared off.
2. Cross level rods to rangefinder and FD radar antennae bent.

Forward Machine Gun Directors


1. Shrapnel holes in #1 Mark 51 director., and Mark 14 Mod. 4 sight.
2. Shrapnel holes in Mark 14, Mod. 4 sight for #2 Mark 51 director.
3. Firing lights to #1 and #2 Mark 41 directors shattered.
4. Director wiring selector switches and cables punctured on both #1 and #2 Mark 51 directors.

Torpedo Director, Mark 27, Mod. 5

1. Telescope, Mark 50 smashed and twisted approximately 40° past stops damaging internal mechanism of director. Train binds.

Depth Charge Release Gear

1. Hydraulic line on bridge punctured by shrapnel.



U.S.S. AULICK (DD569)

RADIO & RADAR DAMAGE

Radar Damage

RCM (Radar Counter-Measure Gear)

1. Dipole antenna destroyed.
2. Transmitting antenna destroyed.
3. All transmission lines damaged at antenna mounting.

FD (Mark 4) Antenna Type CW-66AAH.

1. Three dipole radiating elements damaged. Repaired by ship's force but efficiency of antenna may be impaired.
2. Cross-level connecting rod sheared off at cross-level. Cannot level antenna. Temporarily braced against top of director.
3. Reflector, lower section, slightly damaged, probably does not affect operation.

BL (IFF) Antenna A Part of SC-2 Assembly.

1. Antenna (built into SC-2 antenna) missing. All elements on this structure were destroyed.
2. Upper portion of BL transmission line connecting to antenna damaged.

SG-A Antenna Assembly Type CRP-66ABJ-1.

1. One half parabolic reflector missing.
2. Hole in one door of pedestal housing.
3. Wave guide ten feet below pedestal twisted and badly bent.

SC-2 Antenna Type CG-66ACE. Serial 42.

1. Antenna completely destroyed. Antenna separated from pedestal, reflector screen torn in several places. All couplings and transmission lines and dipoles damaged. Antenna lowered by ship's force and sunk in deep water. Pedestal remains on masthead. Pedestal bearings probably damaged.
2. Part of transmission line damaged and removed from mast.
3. All connections to pedestal damaged or missing.

Radio Damage

1. All antennae; transmitting and receiving including TBS coaxial transmission line destroyed.
2. TBS remote control unit, bridge, pierced by shrapnel - repairable.
3. Line to LR-1 Heterodyne frequency meter damaged.

Enclosure "C"

COMINOP F-01 AA-1
Feb. 1944
CONFIDENTIAL

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING
A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 968133
By RA Date 9/24/04

Philippine - Between Dinagat
Location of ship (area) and Homonhon Island U.S.S. AULICK (DD569)
Zone Time 1753 Date 29 Nov., 1944

NOTES

- (a) REPEL ATTACK FIRST - then collect data for this report
(b) Do not "Gun Deck" this report. If data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy, enter dash in space for which no data is available.
(c) These sheets are to be filled out immediately after action is completed with data available from ship's log, memory, and consultation with ship's officers. Information is essential in order that the effectiveness of our equipment can be determined. Where data are of doubtful accuracy, fill in with general terms.
(d) Forward under separate cover to Readiness Division, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

1. Surprise attack (yes or no) YES Day or night DAY
Formation by SC-2 Radar, attacking planes by
2. Method picking plane up (Radar, binoculars, naked eye) naked eye
3. Range plane was picked up (50,30,10,less than 5 miles) 17 miles
4. Total number of planes observed 6 to 8 Type OSCARS
5. Number of planes attacking own ship 2 Type OSCARS
6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship Formation of 4 and 2 additional singles
(a) Of those attacking own ship 2 singles Type OSCARS
(b) Others Formation of 4 Type OSCARS
7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet All speeds about 275 knots. Altitudes (1) 5000. (2) 200 ft. (3) 500 ft. ft.
8. Number of guns firing - by caliber 5-5"/38, 3-40mm, 6-20mm
9. Ammunition expended - by caliber 5"/38 - 56 rds., 40mm 310 rds., 20mm 445 rds
10. Percent service allowance expended 5"/38-2.7%, 40mm 2.6%, 20mm 1.1%
11. Method of control Director Method of spotting Direct
Method of ranging FD Radar Method of firing Rapid-continuous
12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot #1, 30 seconds, #2, 10 seconds, #3, 15 seconds.
13. Approximate time of first hits #1 Unknown #2, 5 seconds #3, 45 seconds.
14. Approximate time first shot to last shot #1, 15 seconds, #2, 10 seconds #3, 60 seconds.
15. Approximate position angle open fire #1, 15°; #2, 2°; #3, 5°

OVER

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 968133
 By RA NARA Date 6/24/04

16. Approximate position angle cease fire (1) 20° (2) 90° (3) 90°
17. Approximate bearing first shot All relative: (1) 120° (2) 180° (3) 210°
18. Approximate bearing last shot All relative: (1) 125° (2) 180° (3) 180°
19. Approximate range first shot (1) 8000 yds. (2) 3000 yds. (3) 0 yds. Altitude of Plane (1) 5000 ft. (2) 1000 ft. (3) 500 ft.
20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached (1) 8000 yds. (2) 10 yds. (3) 0 yds. Altitude (1) 5000 ft. (2) 90ft. (3) 10 ft.
21. Approximate range last shot (1) 8000 yds. (2) 400 yds. (3) 50 yds. Altitude of Plane (1) 5000 ft. (2) 90ft. (3) 40ft.
22. Approximate altitude of bomb release #2-100 ft., #3 not released - exploded with Size of bomb #2&3- 500 lbs.
23. Approximate range torpedo release at 20 ft. Size of torpedo None
24. Number hits on ship by bombs 1 near miss by torpedoes 0 Was ship strafed No

Size gun - - - No

25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship One (1)

26. Planes shot down:

	SURE (By own ship alone)	SURE (Assist)	Probable Damaged
(a) Those attacking own ship	<u>2</u>		
(b) Other aircraft			

(An aircraft is considered destroyed "Sure," when, as result of own ship's fire: 1. It is seen to crash. 2. It is seen to disintegrate in the air or be enveloped in flames. 3. It is seen to descend on friendly territory and be captured. 4. Pilot and entire crew are seen to bail out.)

(A "Sure-Assist" may be claimed when plane is destroyed as result of own ship's and assisting fire by friendly planes, shore batteries, or other ships.)


(An aircraft is considered probably destroyed when, as result of own ship's fire: It is so damaged as to have less than an even chance of reaching its own territory safely.)

(An aircraft is considered damaged when, as result of own ship's fire: It is so damaged as to require repair before beginning another mission, but has better than an even chance of reaching its own territory safely. Claims shall be based on careful interrogation by proper authority, and every effort shall be made to eliminate duplication of claims.)

27. Best estimate of size gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" 20mm; probable 40mm
28. Performance of ammunition (excellent, good, bad, poor) Good
29. What failures in material occurred in this action? 5"/38 gun #5 projectile hoist power temporarily kicked out. One 20mm had a loading jam aft, firing 15 rds.
30. Sketch: (a) Indicate direction of attack relative ship's head.
 (b) Show relative position of sun.
 (c) Indicate own maneuvers.

Note: Add descriptive text on additional sheet if required to clarify report.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority **NND 968133**
 By **RA** NARA Date **6/24/07**



DINAGAT

USS AULICK (DD569)
 Anti aircraft action
 29 November 1944.

- 1 - Formation of 4 Oscars sighted.
- 2 - 5"/38 battery commenced fire as ship swung left
- 3 - Checked fire to shift to plane making run from astern
- 4 - Commenced fire on first attacking Oscar
- 5 - Ship turning to starboard as plane crashed off port bow.
- 6 - Second Oscar sighted
- 7 - Control on target
- 8 - 5"/38 battery commenced firing
- 9 - 40mm battery commenced firing
- 10 - Irreparable 40mm hits
- 11 - 20mm battery commenced firing
- 12 - Known 20mm hits
- 13 - Plane started burning.
- 14 - Second Oscar exploded off starboard bow as ship was backing full with hard right rudder